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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 940657-CA

v.
Priority 2

KEVIN GURR,
Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Kevin Gurr appeals his convictions for possession
of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) (1994), a third
degree felony, and for possession of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-503

(Supp. 1994) (R. 90-91).

This Court has

jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (Supp.
1994).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Does the evidence support the trial court's finding

that defendant possessed a firearm where police found two
firearms in a trailer in which only defendant resided?

In

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a trial
court's verdict, this court "must sustain the trial court's
judgment unless it is 'against the clear weight of the evidence,
or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been made.'"

State v. Goodman. 763

P.2d 786, 786-87 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted).
2.

Where the statutory scheme prohibits someone previously

convicted of any degree of burglary from possessing a firearm,
does defendant's prior conviction for burglary support his
conviction for possession of a firearm by a restricted person
even though the sentencing court lowered the burglary to a class
A misdemeanor?

Defendant's appellate argument challenges the

trial court's statutory interpretation; therefore, this Court
reviews the trial court's decision for correctness, according it
no deference.

See, e.g., State v. Souza. 846 P.2d 1313, 1317

(Utah App. 1993).
3.

Does the evidence support the trial court's finding

that defendant possessed marijuana with the intent to distribute
where he had materials commonly used to repackage larger amounts
of marijuana into smaller packages for street sale as well as
packages of marijuana of the size commonly used for street sale?
See standard of review for issue number one.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Addendum A contains the text of the relevant constitutional
provisions, statutes, and rules.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By amended information, the State charged defendant with the
following: 1) possession of a controlled substance in a drug free
zone with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) & (5) (1994); 2) possession
2

of drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37a-5 and 58-37-8(5) (1994); and
3) possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a
third degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503
(Supp. 1994).
117-118).

Defendant waived his right to a jury trial (R.

The trial court found that the first two offenses did

not occur in a drug free zone and found defendant guilty of the
lesser included offenses of possession of a controlled substance
with the intent to distribute and possession of drug
paraphernalia (R. 90-91).

The trial court also found defendant

guilty of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person
(id.).

The court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law

to support the convictions (R. 87-89).

Addendum B contains a

copy of the findings and conclusions.
By order filed October 19, 1994, the trial court sentenced
defendant to the statutory indeterminate prison terms of zero to
five years on the possession of a controlled substance and
possession of a dangerous weapon charges, and to a term not to
exceed six months on the possession of paraphernalia charge, with
all sentences to run concurrently (R. 93-94).

The court

suspended the sentences and granted defendant probation (id.).
Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal (R. 112).
Defendant does not appeal his conviction for possession of drug
paraphernalia.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 20, 1993, police officers executed a search
warrant on a trailer (R. 124, 137) . The trailer was located
behind a business owned by Tom King, a friend of defendant's (R.
178).

Defendant had used the trailer as his residence for two

years prior to October 1, 1993 (R. 177). On October 1, 1993,
defendant began spending some nights at his girlfriend's
apartment and had moved some of his belongings into her
apartment, but he was still using the trailer as his "home" (R.
180) .
At the time the officers executed the warrant, defendant had
returned to the trailer to spend the night (R. 126-27, 181). The
officers handcuffed defendant, then searched the ten-by-fourteenfoot trailer (R. 128-29).

The officers discovered six baggies of

marijuana, finger scales, five one-gallon plastic bags with
residue that looked and smelled like marijuana, plastic sandwich
bags, an empty box of plastic sandwich bags, marijuana leaves
strewn over the table top, a mobile phone, a twelve-gauge
shotgun, and a .22 caliber rifle (R. 11, 127-28, 130-32, 143-47,
153-58, 166-68, 171).
The argument sections below contain additional relevant
facts.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

Sufficiency of the evidence; possession of a firearm.

The evidence supports the trial court's finding that defendant
possessed the firearms. The police officers found the firearms
4

in the trailer.

While others had access to the trailer and used

it for limited purposes, only defendant used it as his residence.
Defendant admitted he knew the firearms were in the trailer, but
no evidence established that any of the other persons with access
to the trailer, other than Mr. King, knew the shotgun was in the
trailer, and no evidence established that anyone other than
defendant knew his father's rifle was in the trailer.

Finally,

defendant testified that the .22 calibre rifle belonged to his
father, but defendant's father did not have access to the
trailer.

Because defendant had apparently taken the rifle to a

place where he resided and to which his father did not have
independent access, the trial court reasonably inferred that
defendant possessed the rifle within the meaning of the statute.
2.

Defendant's status as a restricted person.

Defendant

previously pleaded guilty to burglary, and the judge granted his
motion to be sentenced to a class A misdemeanor.

Lowering the

"category" of the burglary meant defendant had a prior conviction
for class A misdemeanor burglary instead of felony burglary.
Because the statute precludes anyone previously convicted of any
degree of burglary from possessing a firearm, the trial court
correctly concluded defendant was a restricted person.
3.

Sufficiency of the evidence: intent to distribute.

Defendant claims that the officers caught him with an
insufficient quantity of marijuana to support an inference that
he intended to distribute it. Defendant's argument ignores
testimony that the officers also found materials suggesting that
5

defendant had purchased bulk quantities of marijuana and had
repackaged it into the smaller quantities commonly used for
street sale. After taking into account the evidence defendant
ignores, the record contains sufficient evidence to support his
conviction for possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute
it.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT
DEFENDANT POSSESSED ONE OR BOTH OF THE FIREARMS FOUND
IN THE TRAILER HE USED AS HIS RESIDENCE
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(1) (Supp. 1994) prohibits someone
convicted of a crime of violence from "possessing" a firearm.

In

order to establish "possession," the evidence must show that
defendant "'exercised dominion and control' over the weapon,
'with knowledge of its presence."
1384 (Utah 1986).

State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380,

When police officers searched the trailer,

they found Mr. King's shotgun and defendant's father's rifle (R.
11, 145, 189-90).

The trial court found that defendant possessed

the firearms (R. 88); defendant claims the evidence is
insufficient to support that finding.
In order to succeed on his sufficiency challenge, defendant
must establish that the clear weight of the evidence contradicts
the trial court's finding that he possessed a firearm.

State v.

Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786-87 (Utah 1988).

See also State v.

Reed, 839 P.2d 878, 879 (Utah App. 1992)•

Defendant must also

"'marshal all the evidence supporting the challenged findings and
6

then show that despite that evidence, the findings are clearly
lacking in support.'"

State v. Hurst, 821 P.2d 467, 471 (Utah

App. 1991) (citation omitted).
Defendant has not marshalled the evidence.

Instead,

defendant focuses on the evidence more supportive of his
argument, while making only incidental reference to the evidence
supporting the trial court's finding.
16-17.

See Appellant's Brief at

This fails to provide a grounds for reversal.

See State

v. Davis, 711 P.2d at 234 (the defendant's reliance on his
interpretation of the evidence failed to support his sufficiency
challenge).
Moreover, when properly marshalled, the evidence amply
supports the trial court's finding that defendant possessed the
firearms.1

The police officers found the firearms in a trailer

where defendant resided (R. 128, 145-46, 180).2

Although others

had access to the trailer, they used it for watching television,
making telephone calls, showering, taking coffee breaks, and
1

Although defendant denied ownership of either firearm,
ownership alone is determinative of possession. State v. Davis,
711 P.2d at 234 (evidence sufficient to establish possession even
though another witness claimed ownership of the gun).
2

Defendant claims he had moved out of the trailer one week
prior to his arrest (Appellant's Brief at 17), suggesting he had
abandoned the trailer as his residence.
However, defendant
admitted that he had not "completely" moved in with his girlfriend,
and that he was still using the trailer as his home (R. 180) .
Defendant also admitted that he was the only one of those with
access to the trailer who slept there, that most of the personal
items in the trailer belonged to him (R. 194) , and that he was
checking his messages at the trailer when police arrived to execute
the search warrant (R. 181). To the extent defendant's argument
suggests he had abandoned the trailer, his own testimony
establishes the contrary.
7

doing paperwork (R. 179-80); only defendant lived in the trailer
and only defendant had his personal belongings in the trailer (R.
128, 180, 194). Defendant also admitted that he knew the guns
were in the trailer (R. 193-94); by contrast, no evidence
established that any of the persons with access to the trailer,
other than defendant and Mr. King, knew the shotgun was in the
trailer, and no evidence established that anyone other than
defendant knew his father's rifle was in the trailer.

The

marshalled evidence supports the trial court's finding that
defendant exercised possessed the firearms with knowledge of
their presence.
Relying on Banks, defendant argues that the evidence is
insufficient to establish that he possessed the firearms because
other persons had access to and used the trailer.
Brief at 17-20.

Appellant's

In Banks, the Utah Supreme Court found the

evidence insufficient to support concluding Banks possessed the
gun found in an apartment in which he, his wife, and a third
party resided.

State v. Banks, 720 P.2d at 1384-85.

The Supreme

Court refused to attribute possession to Banks merely because
police found the gun in an apartment where two other persons
resided with Banks and held that the evidence failed to establish
that Banks "knew the weapon was in the apartment or that he
exercised any control over it." Id.
The evidence in this case establishes a much more exclusive
link between defendant and the firearms.

First, defendant admits

he knew both weapons were in the trailer (R. 194); therefore, the
8

only issue is whether defendant exercised any control over either
weapon.

Defendant kept both weapons in a trailer in which only

he resided (R. 194), unlike Banks where others also resided in
the apartment with Banks. Moreover, the evidence that defendant
"possessed" his father's rifle is especially strong.

Defendant

claimed his father owned the rifle, but defendant's father did
not have independent access to the trailer (R. 179-80, 190, 203204).

Because defendant had apparently taken the rifle to a

place where he resided and to which his father did not have
independent access, the trial court could reasonably infer that
defendant "'exercised dominion and control' over the weapon,
'with knowledge of its presence.'"

Id. at 1384.

Possession of

the rifle independently supports defendant's conviction.
In short, defendant has failed to establish that the clear
weight of the evidence contradicts the trial court's finding that
he possessed one or both of the firearms.
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR BURGLARY CONVICTION MET THE STATUTORY
DEFINITION OF A CRIME OF VIOLENCE; THEREFORE, DEFENDANT
WAS A RESTRICTED PERSON PRECLUDED FROM POSSESSING A
FIREARM
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(1) (Supp. 1994) prohibits someone
previously convicted of a crime of violence from possessing a
firearm.

Section 76-10-501(2) (a) includes burglary as a crime of

violence without restricting it to any particular category of
burglary.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501(2)(a) (Supp. 1994).

On May 2, 1986, Judge Cullen Christensen entered judgment on
defendant's guilty plea to one count of burglary.
9

Addendum C

contains a copy of the judgement.

Judge Christensen granted

defendant's motion to sentence him to a lower category of the
offense: a class A misdemeanor.
(1990).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-4 02

However, Judge Christensen's order does not redefine the

offense to which defendant pleaded as something other than
burglary.
Defendant claims that reducing the category of the offense
to a class A misdemeanor somehow transformed the offense to
criminal trespass, which the statute does not include as a crime
of violence.

Defendant's argument challenges the trial court's

interpretation of the controlling statutes; therefore, this Court
reviews the trial court's decision for correctness, according it
no deference.

See, e.g.. State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1317

(Utah App. 1993).

In construing the relevant statutory terms,

this Court should construe terms of related code sections
harmoniously and should give statutory terms their commonly
accepted meaning unless doing so "results in an application that
is either 'unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant
contradiction of the express purpose of the statute.'"

Id.

(citation omitted).
The version of Section 76-3-402 in effect when defendant
pleaded guilty to burglary permitted a trial court to "enter a
judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1990)

10

(emphasis added) .3 Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-103 and 104 (1990)
define four "categories" of felonies and three "categories" of
misdemeanors-

Reading these statutes together establishes that

lowering the category of an offense has no affect on its
substance: a burglary remains a burglary, but becomes a different
degree of burglary.

Therefore, Judge Christensen's judgment

resulted in defendant's conviction for class A misdemeanor
burglary.
Section 76-10-501 defines burglary, regardless of the
degree, as a crime of violence.

Under the statute's plain

language, defendant's conviction for burglary constituted a crime
of violence and precluded him from possessing a firearm.

Judge

Christensen's order reducing the category of the burglary to a
class A misdemeanor did not change that result: defendant still
pleaded guilty to all of the elements of burglary.
Defendant's argument assumes without legal support or
analysis that criminal trespass is the next lower "category" from
burglary.

Appellant's Brief at 24. Although not spelled out,

defendant's argument assumes that because the burglary statute
defines burglary as a second or third degree felony, lowering his
conviction to a class A misdemeanor implies conviction for a
different substantive crime; defendant settles on criminal
trespass.

3

The legislature has since amended this statute. The
amended version refers to sentencing a defendant to the next lower
"degree" of offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1995).
11

Defendant confuses "category" with "lesser included
offense."

Section 76-3-402 allows the trial court to lower the

former, it does not permit a trial court to enter judgment on a
lesser included offense from that for which the defendant was
convicted or to which the defendant pleaded.

In this case,

defendant pleaded guilty to all of the elements of burglary.
Exercising his discretion under section 76-3-402, Judge
Christensen's judgment recorded defendant's conviction as class A
misdemeanor burglary, not as class A misdemeanor criminal
trespass.4
Based on the above, the trial court correctly concluded that
defendant's prior conviction for burglary constituted a crime of
violence, and that defendant was therefore a restricted person in
possession of a firearm.
POINT III
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT POSSESSED MARIJUANA IN STREETSALE-SIZED PACKAGES, AND THAT HE HAD OTHER ITEMS
COMMONLY USED TO REPACKAGE LARGER QUANTITIES INTO
STREET-SALE QUANTITIES SUPPORTED THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT POSSESSED MARIJUANA WITH INTENT
TO DISTRIBUTE IT
When police officers searched the trailer, they found
marijuana leaves strewn over the table top (R. 144); a set of
finger scales capable of weighing up to three ounces (R. 186);
plastic sandwich bags (R. 144-45); an empty box of plastic
sandwich bags (R. 158); five one-gallon plastic bags containing
4

Defendant's argument also collapses under its own weight:
criminal trespass is a class B or C misdemeanor, depending upon the
circumstances. The criminal trespass statute does not define a
class A misdemeanor criminal trespass.
12

residue that looked and smelled like marijuana (R. 153-54, 166,
171); two small sandwich bags, each containing an eighth of an
ounce of marijuana, and four small sandwich bags, each containing
a quarter of an ounce; and a mobile phone (R. 11).
The officers who testified at trial had substantial law
enforcement experience with drug trafficking.

They testified

that the one-galIon bags could hold up to one-half of a pound of
marijuana, that the one-gallon bags found were the kind typically
used to package one-half pound quantities of marijuana, and that
suppliers to street dealers typically packaged marijuana in onehalf to one-pound quantities (R. 150, 153-55, 168). They also
testified that the sandwich bags and the bags that had been in
the empty box were the kind of sandwich bags street dealers
typically used to package marijuana for street sale, and that
street dealers typically repackaged one-half to one-pound
marijuana packages into one-eighth-ounce packages (R. 134, 16869).

The officers testified that street dealers commonly used

finger scales to weigh their product and to measure out the
quantities of marijuana found in the baggies seized during the
search (R. 134-35, 146-47, 167-68); one officer testified he had
seen over one hundred sets of finger scales and that almost every
dealer had finger scales to weigh his product (R. 146-47).

One

of the officers testified defendant admitted to him that
defendant had received calls on the mobile phone from people
inquiring about purchasing marijuana (R. 129-30).

Finally, one

of the officers testified that even the baggies found constituted
13

too large an amount for personal use, and that someone purchasing
the total amount contained in the baggies would purchase that
amount in a single package, not individual baggies (R. 152-53).
Defendant admitted to police officers that he owned the
baggies containing marijuana (R. 132).5 At trial, defendant
claimed he purchased the eighth-ounce bags for personal use only,
but admitted it was unusual to purchase that much marijuana in
eighth-ounce packages (R. 183-84).

Defendant testified that he

owned the one-gallon bags, and that he placed the one-gallon bags
where the officers found them (R. 190-91) . Defendant also
testified that he owned the finger scales, and that he had used
them to measure his own marijuana (R. 197-98) .
The trial court found that defendant possessed marijuana
with the intent to distribute it (R. 87). On appeal, defendant
claims the record contains insufficient evidence to establish his
intent to distribute marijuana.6

To succeed on this claim,

defendant must establish that the clear weight of the evidence
contradicts the trial court's finding that he intended to
distribute marijuana, State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786-87
(Utah 1988), and must "'marshal all the evidence supporting the
challenged findings'"
App. 1991).

State v. Hurst. 821 P.2d 467, 471 (Utah

Defendant cannot rely on evidence "favoring his

5

At trial, defendant only admitted owning four of the
baggies (R. 183-84).
6

Defendant does not claim he did not possess marijuana and
admitted at trial that the four eighth-ounce baggies belonged to
him (R. 183-84) .
14

innocence and ignoring the conflicting [evidence] against him."
State v. Bingham, 732 P.2d 132, 133 (Utah 1987).
Defendant has not marshalled the evidence.

Instead,

defendant details the evidence supporting his claim of innocence,
while minimizing the evidence the State produced to establish
defendant intended to distribute marijuana.
Brief at 25-27.

See Appellant's

In his two-page evidence summary, defendant

includes a one-line acknowledgment of the State's evidence: "all
the State produced was the packaged marijuana, finger scales and
plastic bags."

Id. at 27. This single sentence ignores much of

the evidence the State produced.
Moreover, the properly marshalled evidence summarized above
establishes that defendant possessed marijuana with the intent to
distribute it.

For obvious reasons, the trier of fact must

typically infer an intent to distribute from circumstantial
evidence such as the presence of equipment used to package
controlled substances for sale and the possession of quantities
larger than the quantities typically purchased for personal use.
See, e.g.. State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah 1985);
State v. Hansen, 710 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1985); State v. Fox. 709
P.2d 316, 320 (Utah 1985); State v. Phelps, 782 P.2d 196, 197-98
(Utah App. 1989).

Viewed as a whole, the evidence in this case

shows that defendant acquired five one-half pound bags of
marijuana; that, while sitting at the table in the trailer, he
repackaged the 2.5 pounds of marijuana into sandwich bags
containing one quarter or one eighth ounces for sale on the

15

street; that he used his finger scales to measure this amount
out; and that he had already disposed of all but six of the
packages.

Although defendant offered alternative explanations

for the State's evidence, he provided only individual
explanations for each piece of evidence; his explanations failed
to rebut the integrated picture painted by the totality of the
evidence.

Therefore, the trial court's conclusion that defendant

intended to distribute marijuana is not against the clear weight
of the evidence.7
Based on the above, the defendant has failed to establish
that the clear weight of the evidence contradicts the trial
court's conclusion that he possessed marijuana with the intent to
distribute it.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction.

7

Defendant argues primarily that police officers did not
catch him with a sufficient quantity from which the trial court
could infer an intent to distribute. Although several cases rely
on possession of a quantity larger than necessary for personal use
as one indicium of intent to distribute, none require it to support
a conviction. See, e.g. . State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 320 (Utah
1985) (relying on quantity to establish intent to distribute);
State v. Hansen, 710 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1985) (relying on quantity
plus the presence of equipment to establish intent to distribute);
State v. Phelps, 782 P.2d at 198 (large quantity and equipment to
process marijuana sufficient to support intent to distribute). The
evidence that defendant possessed materials suggesting he had
repackaged larger quantities of marijuana into smaller, street-sale
quantities established that defendant possessed marijuana with the
intent to distribute it, regardless of the amount the officers
actually found.
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ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED
The briefs adequately set forth the facts and legal
standards to resolve this appeal. Oral argument would be of
little benefit to the court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

IZ^

day of rfprl I

,

1995.
JAN GRAHAM
A t t o r n e y General

& ^yus~J&>~^
THOMAS BRUNKER
Assistant Attorney General
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postage pre-paid, to the following on this /2^day of /4frr4/
1995:
Michael J. Petro
Young & Kessler
101 East 200 South
Springville, Utah 84663
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

DRUG PARAPHERNALIA

58-37a-5

(c) Carburetion tubes and devices;
(d) Smoking and carburetion masks;
(e) Roach clips: meaning objects used to hold burning material,
such as a marihuana cigarette, that has become too small or too
short to be held in the hand;
(f) Miniature cocaine spoons and cocaine vials;
(g) Chamber pipes;
(h) Carburetor pipes;
(i) Electric pipes;
(j) Air-driven pipes;
(k) Chillums;
(1) Bongs; and
(m) Ice pipes or chillers.
History: L. 1981, ch. 76, S 3.

58-37a-4. Considerations in determining whether object
is drug paraphernalia*
In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, the trier of fact, in
addition to all other logically relevant factors, should consider:
(1) statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object
concerning its use;
(2) prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of anyone in control of the
object, under any state or federal law relating to a controlled substance;
(3) the proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of
this chapter;
(4) the proximity of the object to a controlled substance;
(5) the existence of any residue of a controlled substance on the object;
(6) instructions whether oral or written, provided with the object
concerning its use;
(7) descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain or
depict its use;
(8) national and local advertising concerning its use;
(9) the manner in which the object is displayed for sale;
(10) whether the owner or anyone in control of the object is a legitimate
supplier of like or related items to the community, such as a licensed
distributor or dealer of tobacco products;
(11) direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of sales of the object to
the total sales of the business enterprise;
(12) the existence and scope of legitimate uses of the object in the
community; and
(13) expert testimony concerning its use.
History: L. 1981, ch. 76, § 4.
Cross-References. — Expert witnesses,
Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 et seq.

58-37a-5. Unlawful acts.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture,
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compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack,
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze,
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise
introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act.
Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the
person making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper,
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the
purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
History: L. 1981, ch. 76, 8 5.
Meaning of "this act.* — The term "this
act" means Laws 1981, ch. 76, §§ 1 to 6, which
enacted §§ 58-37a-l to 58-37a-6.

Cross-References. — Sentencing for felonies, }§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-301.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
JP^k
Cited.
Intent

Where the buyer of drug paraphernalia only
intended to use the items as evidence in a

subsequent criminal prosecution of the seller, it
was factually and legally impossible for the
defendant to have known that items sold would
be used for illegal purposes. State v. Murphy,
674 P.2d 1220 (Utah 1983).
Cited in State v. Keitz, 856 R2d 685 (Utah
Ct App. 1993).

58-37a-6. Seizure — Forfeiture — Property rights.
Drug paraphernalia is subject to seizure and forfeiture and no property right
can exist in it.
History: L. 1981, ch. 76, S 6.
Compiler's Notes. — This section was declared unconstitutional as violating procedural
due process because it fails to provide for a due
process hearing in connection with forfeitures,
The section is severable and does not render the
remainder of the Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act
invalid. See Murphy v. Matheson, 742 F.2d 664
(10th Cir. 1984).

Severability Clauses. — Section 7 of Laws
1981, ch. 76 provided: "If any provision of this
act or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does
not affect other provisions or applications of the
act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end
the provisions of this act are severable."

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Constitutionality.
This section violates procedural due process
because it fails to provide for a due process

bearing in connection with forfeitures. Murphy
v. Matheson, 742 F.2d 564 (10th Cir. 1984).
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veterinarian may lawfully possess it only in the container in which it was
delivered to him by the person selling or dispensing it.
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, { 7; 1086, ch. 23,
Federal Law. — Section 305 of the Federal
t 5*
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Meaning of "this act" — The term "this Control Act of 1970, referred to in Subsection
act," in Subsection (1), means Laws 1971, ch. (1), is 21 U.S.C. § 825.
145, 55 1 to 22, which enacted this chapter.

58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed
practitioner; or
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (IXa) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsection (IXa) is guilty of afirstdegree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second
degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directlyfroma practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
any of those locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where
controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation of this
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chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and not
concealedfromthose present; however, a person may not be convicted
under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not use the
substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so;
any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances by the
defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense;
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance;
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled substance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in Section
78-3a-2, and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring the
administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of pain
•or suffering;
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled substance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any
controlled substance to another person knowing that the other person
is using a false name, address, or other personal information for the
purpose of securing the same.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a
second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if the
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of
a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor
(c) Apy person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(aXi) while inside
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2Kb).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any
controlled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection
(2Kb), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than
provided in this subsection.
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(bXi), (ii), or (iii),
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a
third degree felony.
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(0 Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2)(aXii) through
(2)(aXvii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree
felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person:
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a
controlled substance in violation of this chapter;
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a
controlled substance to another licensee or other authorized person
not authorized by his license;
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this
chapter or by a rule issued under this chapter;
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or fiirnish any record, notification, order form, statement, invoice, or information required under
this chapter; or
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection as authorized by
this chapter.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xa) shall be punished
by a civil penalty of not more than $5,000. The proceedings are independent of, and not in lieu of, criminal proceedings under this chapter or any
other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by information or
indictment which alleges the violation was committed knowingly or
intentionally, that person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked,
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription
or written order issued or written under the terms of tins chapter;
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any
application, report, or other document required to be kept by this
chapter or to willfully make any false statement in any prescription,
order, report, or record required by this chapter; or
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark,
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trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4Xa) is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under
Subsection (5)(b) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the
grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondaxy
institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, of other
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under
Subsections (5)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center,
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater,
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included
in Subsections (5Xa)(i) through (viii); or
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where
the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less thanfiveyears if the
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole
until the minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been
served.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred
was not as described in Subsection (5Xa) or was unaware that the location
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5)(a).
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class
B misdemeanor.
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
245

58-37-8

OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS

(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by
law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(9) (a) When it appears to the court at the time of sentencing any person
convicted under this chapter that the person has previously been convicted
of an offense under the laws of this state, the United States, or another
state, which if committed in this state would be an offense within this
chapter and it appears that probation would not be of benefit to the
defendant or that probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or
protection of society, the court, notwithstanding Section 77-18-1, may if
there is compliance with Subsection (9Xb), impose a minimum term to be
served by the defendant, of up to *& the maximum sentence imposed by law
for the offense committed.
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term as
provided in Subsection (9Xa), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury
if an indictment, shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint, in
misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment, in addition to
the substantive offense charged, a statement setting forth the alleged
past conviction of the defendant and specifically stating the date and
place of conviction and the offense of which the defendant was
convicted. The allegation shall be presented to the defendant at the
time of his arraignment, or afterwards by leave of court, but in no
event later than two days prior to the trial of the offense charged or
the defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the time of arraignment or
a later date when granted by the court, the court shall read the
allegation of the previous conviction to the defendant, provide him or
his counsel with a copy of it, and explain to the defendant the
consequences of the allegation under Subsection (9)(a). The allegation
of the past conviction of the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial,
except where the admissibility in evidence of a previous conviction is
otherwise recognized as admissible by law.
(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant of the substantive offense charged and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the
defendant of its decision to impose a minimum sentence under
Subsection (9)(a) and inquire as to whether the defendant admits or
denies the previous conviction. If the defendant denies the previous
conviction, the court shall afford him an opportunity to present
evidence showing that the allegation of the past conviction is erroneous or the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant was
pardoned. The evidence shall be made a matter of record. Following
the evidence, the court shall make a finding as to whether the
defendant has a previous conviction, which finding isfinal,except for
a showing of abuse of discretion. Following thefindingsby the court,
the defendant shall be sentenced under Subsection (9)(a) or under the
appropriate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion
determines.
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to probation who violates
that probation is subject to Subsections (9Xa) and (9Xb).
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(d) Nothing in this section in any way limits or restricts Sections
76-8-1001 and 76-8-1002.
(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence
that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the
substance or substances.
(11) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and
supervision.
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate
scope of his employment.
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 8; 1072, ch. 22,
i 1; 1977, ch. 29, ft 6; 1979, ch. 12, § 5; 1985,
ch. 146, S 1; 1986, ch. 196, ft 1; 1987, ch. 92,
ft 100; 1987, ch. 190, $ 3; 1988, ch. 95, S 1;
1989, ch. 50, § 2; 1989, ch. 56, § 1; 1989, ch.
178, S 1; 1989, ch. 187,ft2; 1989, ch. 201, § 1;
1990, ch. 161, S 1; 1990, ch. 163, ft 2; 1990,
ch. 163, ft 3; 1991, ch. 80, ft 1; 1991, ch. 198,
ft 4; 1991, ch. 268, 9 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment by ch. 161, effective April 23, 1990, inserted "to obtain a prescription for" and "or
failure by the person to disclose his receiving
any controlled substance from another source*
in Subsection (4XaXii) and corrected two reference errors in Subsection (13).
The 1990 amendment by ch. 163, ft 2, effective from April 23, 1990 until July 1, 1990,
corrected reference errors in Subsections (9Xa)
and (13Xb). /
The 1990 amendment by ch. 163, ft 3, effective July 1, 1990, substituted "Section 77-18-1*
for "Rule 20, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure"
in Subsection (9Xa).
The 1991 amendment by ch. 80, effective
April 29, 1991, in Subsection (5Xa), inserted
Subsection (ii), redesignated former Subsection
(ii) as (iii), substituted "or institution under
Subsections (5XaXi) and (ii)" for "under Subsection (5XaXiF in Subsection (iii), inserted Subsections (iv) through (viii), redesignated former
Subsections (iii) and (iv) as (ix) and (x), and
substituted "Subsections (5XaXi) through (vuT

for "Subsection (5XaXi) or (ii)" in Subsection
(ix); substituted "Chapter 37a, Title 58, Utah
Drug Paraphernalia Act or Chapter 37b, Title
58, Imitation Controlled Substances Act" for
"Chapters 37a or 37b, Title 58" in Subsection
(13Xa); and added Subsection (14) (appearing
as Subsection (13) after January 1,1992).
The 1991 amendment by ch. 198, effective
April 29, 1991, substituted all of the present
language after "Schedules II through V" in
Subsection (lXaXiii) for "under an order or
prescription," and made stylistic changes in the
introductory paragraph of Subsection (5Xa).
The 1991 amendment by ch. 268, effective
January 1, 1992, deleted former Subsection
(13), imposing a fee of $150 against each person
convicted of, and each juvenile found within the
court's jurisdiction because of, committing an
offense and providing for the use of funds
generated by the fee.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Cross-References* — Cities and towns, prohibitions of sales of narcotics to minors, ft 108-47.
Psychotoxic chemical solvent!, penalties for
use or sale, ft 76-10-101 et seq.
Sentencing for felonies, ftft 76-3-201, 76-3203, 76-3-301.
Sentencing for misdemeanors, (ft 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-301.
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PART 1
CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENSES
76-3-101. Sentencing in accordance with chapter.
(1) A person adjudged guilty of an offense under this code shall be sentenced in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
(2) Penal laws enacted after the effective date of this code shall be classified
for sentencing purposes in accordance with this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-101, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, i 76-3-101.

Compiler's Notes. — The effective date of
this code was July 1, 1973.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law § 525.

C.J.S. — 24 CJ.S. Criminal Law § 1461.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 1206(3).

76-3*102. Designation of offenses.
Offenses are designated as felonies, misdemeanors, or infractions.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-102, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-102.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law f f 28-30.

C.J.S. — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law § 9.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 27.

76-3-103. Felonies classified.
(1) Felonies are classified into four categories:
(a) Capital felonies;
(b) Felonies of the first degree;
(c) Felonies of the second degree;
(d) Felonies of the third degree.
(2) An offense designated as a felony either in this code or in another law,
without specification as to punishment or category, is a felony of the third
degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-103, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, 8 76-3-103.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law {29.

CJJS. — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law §§ 10,12.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 27.
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76-3-104. Misdemeanors classified.
(1) Misdemeanors are classified into three categories:
(a) Class A misdemeanors;
(b) Class B misdemeanors;
(c) Class C misdemeanors.
(2) An offense designated a misdemeanor, either in this code or in another
law, without specification as to punishment or category, is a class B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-104, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, ft 76-3-104.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Cooper v. Utah, 684 F. Supp. 1060
CD. Utah 1987).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law { 30.

C.J.S. — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law I 11.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law •= 27.

76-3-105. Infractions.
(1) Infractions are not classified.
(2) Any offense which is an infraction within this code is expressly designated and any offense defined outside this code which is not designated as a
felony or misdemeanor and for which no penalty is specified is an infraction.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-105, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-105.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Cooper v. Utah, 684 F. Supp. 1060
(D. Utah 1987).

PART 2
SENTENCING
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Definitions —
Aggravation or mitigation of crimes with mandatory sentences — Resentencing.
(1) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person adjudged guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office;
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law § 552.

C.J.S. — 24 CJ.S. Criminal Law §§ 1522,
1523.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=» 1210.

76-3-402. Conviction of lower category of offense.
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the defendant, concludes that-it would be unduly harsh to record the
conviction as being for that category of offense established by statute and to
sentence the defendant to an alternative normally applicable to that offense,
the court may, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, enter a judgment
of conviction for the next lower category of offense and impose sentence accordingly.
(2) Whenever a conviction is for a felony, the conviction shall be deemed to
be a misdemeanor if:
(a) The judge designates the sentence to be for a misdemeanor and the
sentence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a misdemeanor;
or
(b) The imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed
on probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of probation or not,
and he is thereafter discharged without violating his probation.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude any person from
obtaining or being granted an expungement of his record as provided by law.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-402, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-402; 1983, ch. 88, § 6.
Cross-References. — Expungement and

sealing of records, § 77-18-2; Rule 4-207, Rules
of Judicial Administration.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «» 1208(2).

76-3-403. Credit for good behavior against sentence for
misdemeanor.
In any commitment to imprisonment for a misdemeanor offense the custodial authority may in its discretion and upon good behavior of the inmate
allow up to ten days' credit against the sentence to be served for every 30 days
served or up to two days' credit for every ten days served when the period to be
served is less than 30 days.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-403, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-403; 1989, ch. 55, i 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24,1989, substituted "al-

low up to ten days' credit" for "allow five days'
credit," inserted "up to" preceding "two days'
credit," and made stylistic changes,
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History: C. 1953,76-10-307, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, ft 76-10-307; 1993, ch, 75, ft 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment, effective May 3,1993, substituted "explo-

sive, chemical, or incendiary device, knowing it
to be the device* for "infernal machine, knowing
it to be such" and made stylistic changes,

76-10-308. Explosive, chemical, or incendiary device —
Venue of prosecution for shipping.
Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly delivers any explosive, chemical, or incendiary device to any person for transmission without the
consent or direction of the lawful possessor may be prosecuted in the county in
which he delivers it or in the county to which it is transmitted.
H i s t o r i c . 1953,76-10-308, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 75, £ 3.
Repeals and Reenactmenta. — Laws
1993, ch. 75, { 3 repeals former § 76-10-308, as

enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 196, § 76-10-308,
making construction or possession of an infernal machine a third-degree felony, and enacts
the present section, effective May 3,1993.

76-10-309. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1993, ch. 75, § 4 repeals
i 76-10-309, as enacted by Laws 1973, ch 196,
5 76-10-309, specifying the venue of prosecu-

tion for shipping an infernal machine, effective
May 3, 1993. For present comparable provisions, see { 76-10-308.

PART 4
FENCES
76-10-401. Fencing of shafts and wells.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A X J t — Validity of statutes requiring the
construction of fences — modern cases, 87
AJLJUth 1129.

PARTS
WEAPONS
76-10-501. Uniform law — Definitions.
(1) (a) The individual right to keep and bear arms being a constitutionally
protected right, the Legislature finds the need to provide uniform laws
throughout the state.
(b) This part is uniformly applicable throughout this state and in all its
political subdivisions and municipalities. A local authority may not enforce
any rule in conflict with this part and there is a moratorium prohibiting
local authorities from enacting or enforcing any new ordinance, regulation, or rule pertaining tofirearmsuntil May 1, 1995, unless hereafter
authorized by the Legislature by statute.
(2) As used in this part: 9
(a) "Crime of violence* means aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, rape, mayhem, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, housebreaking, eztor136
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tion, or blackmail accompanied by threats of violence, assault with a
dangerous weapon, assault with intent to commit any offense punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year, arson punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, or an attempt to commit any of these
offenses.
(b) "Criminal history background check" means a criminal background
check conducted by a licensedfirearmsdealer on every purchaser of a
handgun through the division or the local law enforcement agency where
thefirearmsdealer conducts business.
(c) "Dangerous weapon" means any item that in the manner of its use or
intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. The
following factors shall be used in determining whether an item, object, or
thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon:
(i) the character of the instrument, object, or thing;
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if any; and
(iii) the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was used.
(d) T)ealerw means every person who is licensed under crimes and
criminal procedure, 18 U.S.C. 923 and engaged in the business of selling,
leasing, or otherwise transferring a handgun, whether the person is a
retail or wholesale dealer, pawnbroker, or otherwise.
(e) "Division* means the Law Enforcement and Technical Services
Division of the Department of Public Safety, created in Section 53-5-103.
(f) "Firearm* means a pistol, revolver, shotgun, sawed-off shotgun, rifle
or sawed-off rifle, or any device that could be used as a dangerous weapon
from which is expelled a projectile by any force.
(g) "Firearms transaction record form* means a form created by the
division to be completed by a person purchasing, selling, or transferring a
handgunfroma dealer in the state.
(h) "Handgun* means afirearmwhich has a short stock and is designed
to be held andfiredby the use of a single hand.
(i) "Prohibited area* means any place where it is unlawful to discharge
a firearm.
(j) "Sawed-off shotgun* or "sawed-off rifle* means a shotgun having a
barrel or barrels of fewer than 18 inches in length, or in the case of a rifle,
having a barrel or barrels of fewer than 16 inches in length, or any
dangerous weapon madefroma rifle or shotgun by alteration, modification, or otherwise, if the weapon as modified has an overall length of fewer
than 26 inches.
History. C. 1953,76-10-501, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-10-501; 1974, ch. 32, S 27;
1985, ch. 35, S 1; 1991, ch. 10, ft 11; 1993, ch.
234, ft 381; 1994, ch. 19, ft 1; 1994, ch. 151,
§ 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, rearranged the
definitions in Subsection (2) so as to place them
in alphabetical order and in Subsection (2Xb)
substituted "aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter" for "murder, voluntary manslaughter."
The 1993 amendment, effective July 1,1993,
deleted former Subsection (2Xa), defining "Bureau"; redesignated former Subsections (2Xb)

and (c) as present Subsections (2Xa) and (b);
added designations (bXi), (bXii), and (bXiii) to
Subsection (2); added present Subsection (2Xc);
rewrote Subsection (2Xd); substituted "firearm"
for "weapon" in Subsection (2Xe); inserted "or
'sawed-off rifle'" and "dangerous" in Subsection
(2Xf); and made stylistic changes throughout
the section.
The 1994 amendment by ch. 19, effective
February 28, 1994, added Subsections (2Xb),
(d), (g), and (h), renumbering the remaining
subsections accordingly.
The 1994 amendment by ch. 151, effective
March 17,1994, substituted "enforce" for "enact
or enforce" in the second sentence in Subsection

137

76-10-502

CRIMINAL CODE

(lXb) and added the second clause in that
sentence, imposing a moratorium on local regulation of firearms.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Weapons Task Force. — Laws 1994, ^ch.
151, {{ 2 to 7 create the Weapons Task Force,

to consist of legislators and citizens representing various specified interests, to study "which
weapons laws should be under local control or
state control; and any conflicts in state, local,
and federal weapons laws." The task force is to
report to the Judiciary Interim Committee by
December 1994 and is repealed December 31,
1994.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Archambeau, 820 R2d 920 (Utah Ct App.
1991).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
•Dangerous weapon."
Constitutionality.
This section provided defendant adequate
notice that his knives and blowgun were "dangerous weapons," and was therefore not unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. State v.

"Dangerous weapon."
Defendant's two 10-inch knives with 5- and
6-inch blades and his 48-inch blowgun were
"dangerous weapons" within the meaning of the
statute. State v. Archambeau, 820 R2d 920
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A L E — Fact that gun was broken, dismantled, or inoperable as affecting criminal respon-

sibility under weapons statute, 81 A.L.R.4th
746.

76-10-502. When weapon deemed loaded.
(1) For the purpose of this chapter, any pistol, revolver, shotgun, rifle, or
other weapon described in this part shall be deemed to be loaded when there
is an unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile in thefiringposition.
(2) Pistols and revolvers shall also be deemed to be loaded when an
unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile is in a position whereby the manual
operation of any mechanism once would cause the unexpended cartridge, shell,
or projectile to be fired.
(3) A muzzle loadingfirearmshall be deemed to be loaded when it is capped
or primed and has a powder charge and ball or shot in the barrel or cylinders.
History: C. 1953, 79-100-502, enacted by
L. 197S, ch. 196, ft 76-10-502; 1974, ch, 82,
{ 28; 1990, ch. 328, ft 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-

ment, effective April 23, 1990, inserted the
subsection designations (1) to (3); substituted
"chapter" for "section" in Subsection (1); and
made stylistic changes throughout

76-10-503. Purchase or possession of dangerous weapon/
handgun — Persons not permitted to have —
Penalties.
(1) (a) Any person who has been convicted of any crime of violence under
the laws of the United States, this state, or any other state, government,
or country, or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or who has
been declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in his possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in
this part.
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(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-off
shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation for a felony may not have
in his possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as
defined in this part.
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a third degree
felony, but if the dangerous weapon is afirearm,explosive, or incendiary
device he is guilty of a second degree felony.
(3) (a) A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer any handgun
described in this part who:
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under the laws of the
United States, this state, or any other state;
(ii) is under indictment;
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in
Section 58-37-2;
(iv) is a drug dependent person as defined in Section 58-37-2;
(v) has been abjudicated as mentally defective, as provided in the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107
Stat. 1536 (1993), or has been committed to a mental institution;
(vi) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States;
(vii) has been dischargedfromthe Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions; or
(viii) is a person who, having been a citizen of the United States,
has renounced such citizenship,
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (3) is guilty of a third degree
felony.
History: C. 1953,76-10-503, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, S 76-10-503; 1977, ch. 82, § 1;
1986, ch. 210, § 1; 1990, ch. 160, 8 1; 1991,
eh. 17,8 l;1991,ch.87,8 5; 1993, ch. 62,8 2;
1994, ch. 19, 8 2; 1994, ch. 149, 8 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, deleted "or a
lawfully admitted alien who has obtained a
special hunting permit from the Department of
Public Safety" before "or any person" in the first
sentence in Subsection (lXa), inserted "or probation" and substituted "in a correctional facility" for "at the Utah state prison or other like
facility* in Subsection (2Xa), substituted "but"
for "and" in Subsection (2Xb), and made minor
stylistic changes.
The 1991 amendments, both effective April
29,1991, made identical changes: in Subsection
(lXa), deleted "who is not either a citizen of the
United States or a lawfully admitted alien
whose business, occupation, or duties require
the use of a dangerous weapon; or any person"
following "person" and deleted the former sec-

ond sentence, which read "The Department of
Public Safety shall adopt rules governing the
issuance and use of special hunting permits for
lawfully admitted aliens."
The 1993 amendment, effective May 3,1993,
deleted "or is incarcerated in a correctional
facility" after "felony" in Subsection (2Xa).
The 1994 amendment by ch. 19, effective
February 28,1994, added Subsection (3).
The 1994 amendment by ch. 149, effective
May 2, 1994, substituted "this state" for "the
state" in Subsection (lXa), "this subsection" for
"this section" in Subsections (lXb) and (2Xb),
and "incendiary device" for "infernal machine"
in Subsection (2Xb).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Federal Law. — The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, cited in Subsection
(3XaXv), is codified mainly as 18 U.S.C. 8 921
etseq.
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tion, because jurisdiction attached under the
statute in effect when the petition for review
was filed. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n
v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909 (Utah
1&93).
—Formal adjudicative proceedings.
Subdivision OXeXiii) confers jurisdiction in
the Supreme Court only over final orders and

Certiorari
When exercising certiorari jurisdiction
granted by this section, the Supreme Court
reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals,
not of the trial court; therefore, the briefs of the
P*1"*68 » h o u l d • ddr *»« ** decision of the Court
* A*?*ii*» ***? **f^£l!*„f^ *££
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992).

Wilderness Alliance v. Board of State Lands &
Forestry, 830 P.2d 233 (Utah 1992).

vulan

l

**lh

CHAPTER 2a
COURT OF APPEALS
Section
78-2a-3.

Court of Appeals jurisdiction.

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court ofAppeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appealsfromthe district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board
of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appealsfromthe district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appealsfromthe juvenile courts;
(d) appealsfromthe circuit courts, except thosefromthe small claims
department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appealsfromorders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases
involving a first degree or capital felony;
6
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(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
0') appealsfromthe Utah Military Court; and
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appealsfromthe Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-S, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, i 46; 1987, ch. 161,1 804; 1988,
ch, 73, t 1; 1988, ch. 210, t 141; 1988, ch.
948,1 8; 1990, ch, 80,1 6; 1990, ch. 224, § 8;
1991, ch, 268, S 22; 1992, ch, 127, t 12; 1994,
ch, IS, 5 45.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsec-

tion (2Xh) and redesignated former Subsections
(2Xh) through (j) as Subsections (2Xi) through
(k).
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994,
substituted 'Board of Pardons and Parole" for
"Board of Pardons" in Subsection (2Xh) and
inserted "Administrative Procedures Act" in
Subsection (4).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
viction or sentence is challenged. Padilla v.
Utah Bd of Pardons, 820 P.2d 473 (Utah 1991).

ANALYSIS

Habeas corpus proceedings.
Scope.
Cited

Scope.
This statute does not authorize the Court of
Appeals to review the orders of every administrative agency, but allows judicial review of
agency decisions "when the legislature expressly authorizes a right of review." Barney v.
Division of Occupational and Professional licensing, 828 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct App.), cert
denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992).

Habeas corpus proceedings.
Appealfromthe dismissal of a habeas corpus
petition, in which defendant claimed only that
his due process rights were violated at a hearing before the parole board, lay to the Court of
Appeals rather than the Supreme Court; the
latter has jurisdiction only over direct appeals
of first degree or capital felony convictions and
appeals in habeas corpus cases where the con-

Cited in State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464
(Utah 1991).

CHAPTERS
DISTRICT COURTS
Section
78-3-4.

78-3-11.5.

Section
78-3-16.5.
78-3-21.

Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases
to circuit court — Appeals —
Jurisdiction when circuit and
district court merged.
State District Court Administrative System.

78-3-21.5.

7

Repealed.
Judicial Council — Creation —
Members — Terms and election — Responsibilities — Reports.
Data bases for judicial boards.
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IN TEE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

t
Plaintiff,

t

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

t

KEVIN W. GURR,

t

Case No. 941400013 FS

:

Judge Ray M. Harding

Defendant(s).

This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Ray M.
Harding presiding on the 26th day of April, 1994.

The Plaintiff

was represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney James R. Taylor.
The Defendant was present in person and represented by Attorney
Michael Petro. The court heard the evidence of the parties and has
issued a written ruling. Being fully advised in the premises, the
Court determines that the following have been established beyond a
reasonable doubt:
FINDINGS OP PACT
1.

The Defendant, Kevin W. Gurr, was convicted of burglary,

CR 86 144 in the Fourth District Court on May 2, 1986.
2.

On October 20, 1993, the Defendant was present in a

house/camp trailer occupied by him when officers of the Narcotics
Task Force executed a warrant authorizing a search of the trailer.
3.

The trailer was within 1,000 feet of the grounds of a

89

church but not within 1,000 feet of the church itself.
4.

No one else resided in the trailer at the time of the

execution of the search warrant.
5.

Personal property including possessions and clothing of

the defendant were located in the trailer.
6. The trailer was quite small, approximately 10 feet wide by
12 or 14 feet long.
7.

Officers located 8 separate baggies containing 1/8 ounce

and 1/4 ounce quantities of marijuana in the trailer in the general
vicinity of the built-in table on one end of the trailer.
8. Officers also located a set of "finger scales", capable of
measuring small amounts or quantities.
9.

Near the table officers located a number of larger sized

bags containing marijuana residue.

Officers testified that the

bags were of the type typically used to package larger amounts of
marijuana which would

then be broken

for sale

into smaller

quantities such as the baggies of marijuana recovered.
10. A Mossberg 12 gauge shotgun and a Springfield .22 caliber
rifle were located in a closet inside the trailer.
11.

The evidence adduced

at trial

indicated

that

the

Defendant, while he did not own the firearms, knowingly had
possession of the weapons.
12.

A motorola mobile phone was found within the trailer.

13. In response to questions from the officers, the Defendant
stated that the marijuana had been "fronted" or provided on credit

2

and that people had called on the phone to inquire about marijuana.
14. Officers located several pipes used for the ingestion of
marijuana.
From the forgoing findings of fact the Court makes and enters
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1*

The

Defendant

was

knowingly

and

intentionally

in

possession of drug paraphernalia including items used or intended
for use in the storage or consumption of marijuana.
2.

The Defendant, a restricted person under U.C.A. Section

76-10-503,

1953

as

amended,

knowingly

and

intentionally

had

firearms in his custody or control.
3.

The Defendant had possession of marijuana with intent to

distribute the marijuana.
4. None of the activities described took place within a drug
free zone.

DATED this / G

day of &3L-1994.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

MICHAEL J. PETRO
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
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ADDENDUM C

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT W!Uuxt-

™ *'

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NUMBER:

CR-86-144

vs.

DATE:

KEVIN GURR,

CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE

Defendant.

Rept.:

May 2, 1986

E.V. Quist, CSR

JUDGMENT
This matter came before the Court for pronouncement of
Judgment with Kent Barry, Deputy County Attorney, appearing in
and on behalf of the State of Utah. The defendant was present in
Court and was represented by Attorney Michael Petro.
The defendant previously entered a plea of Guilty to a
charge of Burglary, a Third Degree Felony, at which time the
matter was referred to the Adult Probation and Parole Department
for a presentence investigation and report. The report has now
been completed and submitted to the Court along with the recommendations.
Mr. Petro addressed the Court in defendant's behalf and
stated the defendant concurs with the recommendation with the
exception of the 30 day jail time. Mr. Petro made a Motion to
sentence defendant under the next lower offense.
The State objected to defense motion and argued same.
The defendant addressed the Court in his own behalf.
The Court granted the defense motion and defendant to
be sentence under a Class A Misdemeanor due to the circumstances
surrounding the charge.
There being no legal reason why Judgment should not be
pronounced at this time, it is now the Judgment of the Court that

the defendant be confined in the Utah County Jail for a period of
one (1) year, pay a fine of $500.00 and restitution as is
appropriate under direction of the Probation Department.
Execution on the jail sentence is suspended and defendant placed
on probation under the following conditions:
1. Defendant to enter agreement with Adult Probation
and Parole Department and comply with terms of
probation.
2.

That he make himself available to the Department
and the Court when requested to do so.

3.

That he violate no laws of the United States, Utah
or any municipality wherein he may reside.

4.

Defendant to pay a fine of $500.00 or perform 100
hours Community Services in lieu of that fine.

5.

That he pay restitution as directed by the Probation Department.

6.

That he have no contact with the victims during his
probation period.

7.

Defendant to serve 45 days in the Utah County Jail
with work release as arranged with the Department.

The defendant to report to the Utah County Jail no
latter than 7:00 p.m. Monday, May 5th, 1986.
The Court to retain jurisdiction in this matter as to
change this order from time to time when so warranted.
Dated this
day of May, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

STATEOFUTAH

)
)SS
OOUNTYOFUTAH )
I, the undersigned, Clerk of the Fourth District Court
of Utah County, Utah, do hereby certify that tha
annexed and foregoing is a true and full copy of an
original document on file in my office as such Cleric
Witness my hand^nd *e*l of said Court
dayof
OARMAB

</C£nt^

TENSEN, JUDGE

